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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point One 
Ms. Olson urges that Mr. Jensen should be required to marshal the 
evidence in favor of the lower court's findings. However, as will be discussed 
below, Mr. Jensen's appeal addresses the legal sufficiency of the lower court's 
conclusions of law, and the court's failure to make findings of material facts. 
Therefore, marshaling is not required or even appropriate. 
Point Two 
Ms. Olson argues that the court below committed harmless error when it 
failed to make a finding as to the ownership of the business. Ms. Olson 
suggests that such findings, at least with regard to Clara Jensen's shares, are 
implied in the division of property contained in the conclusions of law and that 
the error is harmless. However, as will be discussed below, Ms. Olson fails to 
confront that the court's conclusions of law imply away, not just Clara Jensen's 
ownership in the company, but also Mark Jensen's ownership. While the proper 
ownership of Clara Jensen's shares was at least under some debate, Mark 
Jensen's status as an equity holder in the company was never disputed and, 
while the court below never got around to pegging his ownership with any 
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specificity, the court seems to recognize in its findings of fact that he owns at 
least some substantial number of shares. By failing to make findings on 
material facts, the court committed reversible error. 
Point Three 
Ms. Olson asserts that it was within the court's discretion to determine 
that the entire increase in company equity was marital property. However, as 
will be discussed below, while the court makes no findings on the material 
facts regarding company ownership, it seems to recognize that some substantial 
equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen. Furthermore, the court's findings 
regarding Clara Jensen's shares are not clearly stated. It is not within the 
court's discretion to determine that equity ascribable to shares belonging to 
third parties is marital property. By determining that the entire increase in 
company equity was marital property, the court committed a reversible error. 
Point Four 
Ms. Olson admits that the court awarded attorneys fees in the case 
without making required inquiry or findings. However, Ms. Olsen asserts the 
failure was harmless error. In awarding attorney's fees the trial court must 
consider the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to 
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The court below did none of 
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these things. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for Mr, Jensen to marshal the 
evidence as his appeal does not challenge a finding of fact 
Ms. Olsen urges that Mr. Jensen should be required to marshal the 
evidence in favor of the lower court's findings. However, Mr. Jensen's appeal 
does not seek to challenge a finding of fact, but rather, addresses the legal 
sufficiency of the lower court's conclusions of law, and the court's failure to 
make findings of material facts. Therefore, marshaling is not required or even 
appropriate. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) requires that "A party 
challenging a fact finding must marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." As will be discussed below, Mr. Jensen's appeal asserts 
that the lower court failed to make findings on material facts regarding 
ownership interests in the company, and that it acted outside of its discretion 
when it determined that the entire increase in company equity was marital 
property. These are issues of law and do not constitute a challenge of a fact 
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finding. It is difficult to see how a marshaling of evidence would even apply to 
these legal challenges. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Olson asserts that the application of the legal 
standards here are so highly fact sensitive as to require Mr. Jensen to marshal 
the evidence. Appellee's Brief, p. 6. Ms. Olsen also asserts that sufficient 
findings on the material issue of equity ownership in the company can be 
implied by the court's ultimate judgment. Mr. Jensen disagrees, but is willing, 
since Ms. Olsen raises the issue, to conduct the exercise here and demonstrate 
that the court's errors of law are in no way mitigated by a recitation of 
evidence. 
The court below determined that the entire increase in company equity 
was marital property. Ms. Olsen asserts that a finding that Mr. Jensen was 
deemed owner of Clara Jensen's shares can fairly be implied from this 
judgment. But even if this is true, the judgment still fails to take into 
consideration Mark Jensen's equity ownership. While the court fails to make 
findings on material facts regarding Mark Jensen's ownership interests in the 
company, as will be discussed below, the court seems to recognize that Mark 
Jensen is an owner of some substantial portion of the company. If that is the 
case, then some part of the increase in the company's equity would be 
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ascribable to his shares. The increase in equity ascribable to Mark Jensen's 
shares would properly belong to Mark Jensen and any judgment deeming that 
increase to be marital property would be in error as a matter of law. 
The court heard testimony that disclosure statements in the company's 
Form 1120 corporate tax return list Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen as each 
owning half the company. Trial Tr. July 31, 2006, p. 16,1. 17- p. 17,1. 4. The 
court heard testimony that Clara Jensen assigned all of her shares, half each, to 
Mr. Jensen and to Mark Jensen and the court took as evidence stock certificates 
noting these assignments. Id. at p.30,1. 10-p.32,1. 3. The court heard 
testimony from Clara Jensen that the shares are Mr. Jensen's and Mark 
Jensen's inheritance. Id at p. 117,11. 19-21. 
Ms. Olsen asserts that this represents more than a "scintilla" of evidence 
supporting an implied finding by the trial court that Mr. Jensen is one-half 
owner of the company. But even if Ms. Olsen is right, it still does not support 
the trial court's judgment that all of the increase in company equity is marital 
property. Appellee's Brief, pp. 8-9. 
Ms. Olson repeatedly points to the possibility that the court impliedly 
found that Mr. Jensen owns some part of Clara Jensen's equity, as though that 
would justify the court's judgment that all the increase in equity is marital 
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property. However, Ms. Olson persistently ignores the court's findings that 
indicate at least some substantial equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen. 
And, as will be discussed below, to the extent Mark Jensen - who is not, after 
all, a party to the divorce - retains an equity ownership, the court was in error 
when it determined an increase in equity ascribable to his shares is marital 
property. 
There simply is no evidence supporting a finding that all of the increase 
in company equity is marital property. In fact, while it declines to make 
specific findings on the issue, the court itself seems to recognize that Mark 
Jensen is an owner of some substantial portion of the company equity. The 
court found that in 1980, 20,000 shares were owned by Delbert Jensen and his 
wife Clara Jensen, 20,000 shares were owned by Arnell Jensen and his wife 
Norine Jensen, and 10,000 shares were held as treasury stock. Supp. Findings 
of Fact, f^ 32. The court found that Arnell Jensen's stock was subsequently 
assigned to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen as tenants in common. Id. at % 38. The 
court found that in 1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were divided 
equally among Mr. Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at f 39. The 
court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares passed to his 
wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at 140. The court found that in 1999 Clara Jensen 
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assigned some of her shares to Mr. Jensen and the rest of her shares to Mark 
Jensen. Id at f 42. 
Thus, even the court's own findings mitigate against a judgment that all 
the increase in equity is marital property, never mind the evidence supporting 
those findings. 
POINT II 
By failing to make findings on material facts, the court committed a 
reversible error of law 
Ms. Olson argues that the court below committed harmless error when it 
failed to make a finding as to the ownership of the business. However, the trial 
court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah CtApp. 1987). The findings 
must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal 
the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented. 
Id 
The trial court heard evidence concerning ownership of the company. 
Trial Tr., July 31,2006, pp. 4-136. The court found that in 1980 the total 
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number of shares in the company was 50,000. Supp. Findings of Fact, f 31. 
The court found that in 1980, 20,000 shares were owned by Delbert Jensen and 
his wife Clara Jensen, 20,000 shares were owned by Amell Jensen and his wife 
Norine Jensen, and 10,000 shares were held as treasury stock. Id. at \ 32. The 
court found that Amell Jensen's stock was subsequently assigned to Mr. Jensen 
and Mark Jensen as tenants in common. Id. at f 38. The court found that in 
1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were divided equally among Mr. 
Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at \ 39. 
The court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares 
passed to his wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at f 40. The court heard testimony from 
the company's tax accountant that, according the tax accountant's records, Mr. 
Jensen and Mark Jensen each own 11 percent of the company's shares and 
Clara Jensen owns 78 percent. Trial Tr. July 31,2006, p. 12,11. 19-21. The 
court found that in 1999 Clara Jensen assigned some of her shares to Mr. 
Jensen and the rest of her shares to Mark Jensen. Id. at f 42. The court found 
that Clara Jensen assigned her shares to Mr. Jensen and Mark Jensen to protect 
her assets and that Clara Jensen testified that the shares are Mr. Jensen's and 
Mark Jensen's inheritance and that the assignment would become a transfer to 
them upon her death. Id. at fflf 44-45. 
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The court made no specific findings as to the ultimate ownership of the 
company. It would seem logical from the findings discussed above that the 
court recognized Mark Jensen as an owner of corporate equity. However, the 
court said that the increase in the total equity in the company is marital 
property and accordingly divided the increase in total equity in the company 
between Mr. Jensen and Ms. Olson. Supp. Conclusions of Law, fflf 22, 23. 
Ms. Olson suggests that findings, at least with regard to Clara Jensen's 
shares, are implied in the division of property contained in the conclusions of 
law and that the error is harmless. However, Ms. Olson fails to confront that 
the court's conclusions of law imply away, not just Clara Jensen's ownership in 
the company, but also Mark Jensen's ownership. While the proper ownership 
of Clara Jensen's shares was at least under some debate, Mark Jensen's status 
as an equity holder in the company was never disputed and, while the court 
below never got around to pegging his ownership with any specificity, the 
court seems to recognize in its findings of fact that he owns at least some 
substantial number of shares. 
As argued in Appellant's Brief, to the extent the court deemed as marital 
property equity that properly belongs to third parties, the court has committed a 
reversible error of law. Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-9. The trial court failed to 
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make findings on the material issue of company ownership, and its failure to do 
so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. However, the fact of Mark Jensen's ownership of at least some 
equity, which the court seems to recognize, though it makes no specific finding 
on the issue, would not support the court's judgment in which it deemed the 
entire increase in the company's equity as marital property. 
In support of her contention that the court committed harmless error 
when it failed to make findings concerning company ownership, Ms. Olson 
sites to Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. JWCJR, 1999 UT App 91, 977 P.2d 
541 (Utah CtApp. 1999), for the proposition that harmless error can occur 
where the unstated findings can be reasonably implied. 
In Colonial Pacific the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a judgment 
enforcing a lease agreement, concluding that the court's findings of fact were 
insufficient to support its judgment. Id. at f 1. In Colonial Pacific, an 
autobody shop sought a computer system from a vender. Id. at*[[ 2 Under a 
finance lease agreement, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. purchased the system 
from the vendor then leased it to the autobody shop. Id. Before the autobody 
shop received the computer system, Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. Required 
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the autobody shop owner to sign an "acceptance and acknowledgment" form. 
Id. After the autobody shop received the computer system, Colonial Pacific 
Leasing Corp. called the autobody shop and obtained a verbal verification that 
the computer system was acceptable. Mat fflf 3,4. Later that day the computer 
system crashed and after several days of unsuccessfully trying to get it to work 
the autobody shop returned it to the vendor. Id. at 15 . Colonial Pacific 
Leasing Corp. sought to recover the unpaid lease payments and the trial judge 
concluded that the autobody shop had breached the lease agreement by failing 
to make the required lease payments. Idat % 6, 
In concluding that the trial court had failed to make findings of fact on 
the pivotal issue of whether the autobody shop had a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect the computer system, the court said, "It is well settled that the trial court 
should make findings on all material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to 
do so is generally considered reversible error and requires a remand." Id at f 
17 (Citations omitted). 
However, the court went on to say that a trial court's decision may be 
affirmed if the failure to make the missing findings can be viewed as harmless 
error. Id. (Citations omitted). Harmless error can occur two ways: First, if the 
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which the 
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findings are missing or, second, even given controverted evidence, if the absent 
findings can reasonably be implied. Id 
According to that court, unstated findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted 
evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but simply 
failed to record the factual determination it made. Mat f 18 (citation omitted). 
However, findings of fact may not be implied when the ambiguity of the facts 
makes such an assumption unreasonable. Id. (Citation omitted). The court said 
that "we will not imply a missing finding where there is a matrix of possible 
factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court's actual findings." Id. 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Under Ms. Olson's rational, the appeals court in Colonial Pacific would 
have concluded that the trial court's judgment against the autobody shop 
contained an implicit finding that the autobody shop had a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the computer system. However, the court rejected that 
rationale on the grounds that the facts were disputed and "not capable of 
supporting only a finding" of acceptance. Mat % 19. 
As in Colonial Pacific, the facts here were disputed and are not capable 
of supporting only a finding that the entire increase in the company's equity is 
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marital property. Moreover, the facts specifically found by the court indicating 
an equity ownership belonging to Mark Jensen do not support a finding that the 
entire increase in the company's equity is marital property. 
Furthermore, the court's judgment that the entire increase in the 
company's equity is marital property does not support Ms. Olson's contention 
that "it is reasonable to assume that the trial court found that Mr. Jensen was a 
one-half owner o f the company. The court's judgment would seem instead to 
assume that Mr. Jensen was the sole owner of the company. 
It is inconceivable that the court intended to strip Mark Jensen of all, or 
even any, equity ownership in the company. However, as discussed above, 
while the court's findings of fact seem to recognize Mark Jensen as an equity 
holder, the court's judgment that the entire increase in company equity is 
marital property would seem to assume away entirely Mark Jensen's equity 
ownership. 
It is too much, given the court's schizophrenic treatment of Mark 
Jensen's equity ownership, to simply assume, as Ms. Olson would have it, that 
the court's "findings" regarding Clara Jensen's stock ownership are clearly 
implied by the court's judgment that the entire increase in equity is marital 
property. Not only are the relevant facts in dispute as they were in Colonial 
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Pacific, but the facts are not capable of supporting only a finding that the entire 
increase in the company's equity was marital property. On the contrary, it 
seems that the facts are not at all capable of supporting the finding that the 
entire increase in company equity is marital property. 
POINT HI 
Because there were other owners of company equity besides Mr. Jensen, it 
was not within the court's discretion to determine that the entire increase 
in company equity was marital property 
The court below ruled that the increase in the adjusted total equity of the 
company is marital property and divided it accordingly. Supplemental 
Conclusions of Law, ff 22, 23. Ms. Olson asserts that it was within the court's 
discretion to determine that the entire increase in company equity was marital 
property. Marital assets encompass all of the assets of every nature possessed 
by the parties. Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah CtApp. 1996) 
(Citing Englertv. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978)). Possession 
connotes not only physical possession, but also legal possession. Id. Here, 
neither of the parties has physical or legal possession of some part of the 
increase in company equity that the court found to be marital property. 
As was discussed in Point II above, while the court declined to make a 
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specific finding as to Mark Jensen's equity ownership in the company, it seems 
nevertheless to recognize that Mark Jensen owns at least some portion of the 
equity. The court found for instance that Arnell Jensen's stock was assigned to 
Mr, Jensen and Mark Jensen as tenants in common, Supp. Findings of Fact, f 
38. The court also found that in 1986 the 10,000 shares of treasury stock were 
divided equally among Mr. Jensen, Mark Jensen and Delbert Jensen. Id. at f 
39. The court found that Delbert Jensen died in 1989 and all of his shares 
passed to his wife, Clara Jensen. Id. at f 40. The court found that in 1999 
Clara Jensen assigned some of her shares to Mr. Jensen and the rest of her 
shares to Mark Jensen. Id. at f 42. 
While the court made no specific findings as to the ultimate ownership of 
the company, it would seem logical from the findings discussed above that the 
court recognized Mark Jensen as an owner of corporate equity. However, the 
court said that the increase in the total equity in the company is marital 
property and accordingly divided the increase in total equity in the company 
between Mr. Jensen and Ms. Olson. Supp. Conclusions of Law, fflf 22, 23. 
Also as discussed in Point II above, Ms. Olson urges that the court's 
determination that all the increase in the company's equity is marital property 
supports her contention that the court implies that one-half ownership of the 
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company resides in Mr. Jensen. However, as discussed in Point II above, this 
does not follow. A determination that all of the increase in equity is marital 
property would rather support an implication that the court deems there are no 
other owners of equity besides Mr. Jensen (or, perhaps Mr. Jensen and Ms. 
Olson - however there appears to be no suggestion from any quarter that Ms. 
Olson is an owner of equity). 
Ms. Olson asserts that Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct.App. 
1996) is inapposite, claiming its holding that marital assets must be legally 
possessed by one or both of the parties pertains only to assets held in a trust 
created by third parties. This pinched view ignores the court's broadly 
constructed rule of the case: "[F]or assets to be distributed, the assets must be 
in the possession of one, or both, of the marital parties....[MJarital assets 
encompass all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties. While 
possession usually connotes physical possession, we believe it also connotes 
legal possession." Enrody, 914 P.2d at 1169 (citations omitted). 
Enrody involved an appeal from a divorce decree. At issue was an inter-
vivos trust into which had been transferred various parties' interests in a family 
ranch. Id. at 1168. Beneficiaries of the trust included the parties to the 
divorce, their children, and various other members of the extended family. Id. 
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Ms. Enrody, who had filed for divorce, was divested of her shares in the trust 
pursuant to its terms. Id. The trial court denied Ms. Enrody's claims against 
the trust, but found that Mr. Enrody's shares in the trust were marital property. 
Id. In concluding that Ms. Enrody was not entitled to a distribution of the assets 
held in the trust, the Utah Court of Appeals said, 'the equitable powers of the 
trial court do not allow the distribution of assets that are not in the legal 
possession of the divorcing parties. Id. at 1171-72. 
As in enrody, the present case involves assets not in the legal possession 
of the divorcing parties. Ms. Olson repeatedly points to the possibility that the 
court impliedly found that Mr. Jensen owns Clara Jensen's equity. However, 
Ms. Olson persistently ignores the court's findings that indicate at least some 
substantial equity ownership resides with Mark Jensen. To the extent the court 
finds ownership with Mark Jensen (and to the extent the court fails to make 
findings on the material issue of Clara Jensen's ownership), it is not within the 
court's discretion to determine that the entire increase in company equity was 
marital property. 
POINT IV 
It was not within the trial court's discretion to awarded attorney fees 
without considering need, ability to pay, or reasonableness 
19 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ms. Olsen. However, the trial 
court made no inquiry nor findings concerning Ms. Olsen's financial need, Mr. 
Jensen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees. Ms. Olsen admits the 
court failed to make required findings to support its award but she asserts that 
the court's failure is harmless error. Appellee's Brief, p. 19. 
In awarding attorney fees, the trial court must consider the receiving 
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees. Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d, 171, 2000 UT 
App 236,^30 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). A trial court's findings of fact must show 
that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, 
the evidence. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). The findings 
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). A trial court's failure to provide adequate findings is 
reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record. See id. at 1334-35 
(vacating an alimony award and remanding for adequate findings). 
Ms. Olsen points to no authority for the proposition that a court may 
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dispense with the required findings in awarding attorneys fees, but points to 
Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp., 1999 Utah Ct.App. 91, 977 P.2d 541, a 
financing lease case, to support her contention that the court's award of 
attorneys fees itself renders it reasonable to imply unstated findings. 
Appellee's Brief, p. 19. 
Ms. Olsen asserts that the court's finding that Mr. Jensen had a higher 
income than Ms. Olsen should serve as reasonable inference of a finding of Ms. 
Olsen's financial need and Mr. Jensen's ability to pay. However, a simple 
finding that Mr. Jensen makes more than Ms. Olsen does not constitute 
sufficiently detailed findings or subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusions on the factual issues were reached concerning Ms. 
Olsen's financial need OR Mr. Jensen's ability to pay. 
Similarly, Ms. Olsen asserts that an affidavit of fees submitted by Ms. 
Olsen's attorney, stating the fees were reasonable, ought to serve as inference 
that the court considered and found the fees to be reasonable. In both this 
assertion and the assertion discussed above concerning ability and need, Ms. 
Olsen essentially argues that the court's award of attorney fees ought to be 
taken as reasonably implying that the required findings were made. But this 
assertion ignores the requirement that findings be sufficiently detailed and 
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include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion was reached. 
Here, there are no findings, much less findings sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the steps the court took in making the required inquiry concerning Ms. 
Olsen's financial need, Mr. Jensen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court's award to Ms. Jensen of the 
increase in the value of the company stock and attorney fees should be 
reversed. Appellant, Mr. Jensen, asks for an award of attorneys fees 
incurred on appeal. 
DATED this /C7 ^ i a ^ o f ^ ^ , 2007. 
DouglasX. Neeley (#629 
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